Part IX · External Actors

Chapter 41

Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks

Arena 8.5 · weight 2.35 · reading 61.5 · aligned majority

41.1Scope

Islamist networks and the OIC bloc; Pakistan (its state, army and armed groups) and Bangladesh; and domestic networks they fund or inspire, such as the banned PFI.

Principal evidence: Mean of two contests. Abroad: India’s counter-leverage 6/10 (Operation Sindoor, NIA, PFI ban, FATF, Gulf partners) vs the networks’ external reach (65%). At home: the Hindutva core (18.8% of voters) vs the consolidated Muslim political bloc (12.8% of voters: 14.2% of Indians, ~90% voting against the NDA in 2024; Muslims are 20%+ of the population in 96 of 543 Lok Sabha seats) = 60%.

41.2Significance

Oil and gas, Gulf remittances, terror and war on the western front, the eastern border and infiltration, Kashmir and OIC diplomacy, and street mobilisation at home.

41.3Indicators and weights

Table 41.1 lists the 10 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator’s reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 41.1. Indicators of arena 8.5

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)	0.14	59.5
Islamist networks & OIC: Security: J&K exchange ratio 2014-23¹	0.06	64.8
Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)²	0.06	52.2
Pakistan: Security: Lowy military and J&K exchange ratio³	0.25	65.6
Pakistan: Economic (Lowy)	0.06	87.1
Pakistan: Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)	0.11	78.8
Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)⁴	0.04	14.0
Bangladesh: Comprehensive power (Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs Bangladesh 9.0)⁵	0.10	81.6
Bangladesh: Contest of documented acts since Aug 2024⁶	0.07	16.7
Bangladesh: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)⁴	0.01	14.0
Arena reading	1.00	61.5

41.4Reading

The arena reads 61.5, 11.5 points above parity, and is classified as aligned majority (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 2.35 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.34 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Pakistan: Economic (Lowy) (87.1), the lowest for Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together) (14.0).

Figure 41.1. Readings of arena 8.5 by indicator

050100

Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)59.5

Islamist networks & OIC: Security: J&K exchange ratio 2014-2364.8

Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)52.2

Pakistan: Security: Lowy military and J&K exchange ratio65.6

Pakistan: Economic (Lowy)87.1

Pakistan: Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)78.8

Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)14.0

Bangladesh: Comprehensive power (Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs Bangladesh 9.0)81.6

Bangladesh: Contest of documented acts since Aug 202416.7

Bangladesh: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)14.0

Arena reading61.5

Hindutva-alignedOpposed

Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

41.5Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas’s own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)

Reading 59.5%

Hindutva core 19 vs Muslim bloc 13

Figure 41.2. Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)

Reading59.5%18.8 : 12.8

Hindutva coreMuslim bloc

Data table

	Hindutva core	Muslim bloc	Hindutva core share
Reading	18.8	12.8	59.5%

Figure 41.3. The 6 biggest of 6 (seats)

Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >20%101

Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >20% / >30%80

Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share 20-39.9%67

Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim share of electorate >30%50

Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >=40%29

Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >50% (majority)15

Data table

	seats	Side
Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >20%	101	Opposed
Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >20% / >30%	80	Opposed
Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share 20-39.9%	67	Opposed
Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim share of electorate >30%	50	Opposed
Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >=40%	29	Opposed
Muslim political bloc: Lok Sabha PCs by Muslim population share >50% (majority)	15	Opposed

Figure 41.4. Each counted row (% of Muslim voters)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Muslim political bloc: Muslim vote to INDIA bloc 202465

0100%

Data table

	% of Muslim voters	Side
Muslim political bloc: Muslim vote to INDIA bloc 2024	65	Opposed

Measure 2. Islamist networks & OIC: Security: J&K exchange ratio 2014-23

Reading 64.9%

Terrorists killed 1753 vs security forces and civilians 950 (SATP)

Measure 3. Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)

Reading 52.2%

Terrorists killed 132 vs Security forces and civilians killed 121

Measure 4. Islamist networks & OIC: Abroad: counter-leverage vs external reach (judgement, not measured)

Reading 65.3%

Replaced by the measured arena India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power.

Figure 41.5. The 15 biggest of 44 (US$ million)

Gulf-GCC: India merchandise imports from West Asia- GCC1,22,943

Gulf-GCC: India merchandise imports from West Asia- GCC1,21,666

Gulf-UAE: India merchandise imports from U ARAB EMTS63,889

Gulf-UAE: India merchandise imports from U ARAB EMTS63,403

Gulf-GCC: India merchandise exports to West Asia- GCC56,875

Gulf-GCC: India merchandise exports to West Asia- GCC55,713

Gulf-UAE: India merchandise exports to U ARAB EMTS37,359

Gulf-UAE: India merchandise exports to U ARAB EMTS36,638

Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise imports from SAUDI ARAB30,790

Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise imports from SAUDI ARAB30,121

Gulf-Qatar: India merchandise imports from QATAR12,464

Gulf-Qatar: India merchandise imports from QATAR12,293

Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise exports to SAUDI ARAB11,757

Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise exports to SAUDI ARAB10,281

Gulf-Kuwait: India merchandise imports from KUWAIT8,286

Data table

	US$ million	Side
Gulf-GCC: India merchandise imports from West Asia- GCC	1,22,943	Opposed
Gulf-GCC: India merchandise imports from West Asia- GCC	1,21,666	Opposed
Gulf-UAE: India merchandise imports from U ARAB EMTS	63,889	Opposed
Gulf-UAE: India merchandise imports from U ARAB EMTS	63,403	Opposed
Gulf-GCC: India merchandise exports to West Asia- GCC	56,875	Opposed
Gulf-GCC: India merchandise exports to West Asia- GCC	55,713	Opposed
Gulf-UAE: India merchandise exports to U ARAB EMTS	37,359	Opposed
Gulf-UAE: India merchandise exports to U ARAB EMTS	36,638	Opposed
Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise imports from SAUDI ARAB	30,790	Opposed
Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise imports from SAUDI ARAB	30,121	Opposed
Gulf-Qatar: India merchandise imports from QATAR	12,464	Opposed
Gulf-Qatar: India merchandise imports from QATAR	12,293	Opposed
Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise exports to SAUDI ARAB	11,757	Opposed
Gulf-SaudiArabia: India merchandise exports to SAUDI ARAB	10,281	Opposed
Gulf-Kuwait: India merchandise imports from KUWAIT	8,286	Opposed

Figure 41.6. Each counted row (percent)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Gulf-Oman: growth of India imports from OMAN9.43

Gulf-Bahrain: growth of India imports from BAHARAIN IS5.25

Gulf-SaudiArabia: growth of India imports from SAUDI ARAB2.22

Gulf-UAE: growth of India exports to U ARAB EMTS1.97

Gulf-UAE: growth of India imports from U ARAB EMTS0.77

0100%

Data table

	percent	Side
Gulf-Oman: growth of India imports from OMAN	9.43	Neutral / not counted
Gulf-Bahrain: growth of India imports from BAHARAIN IS	5.25	Neutral / not counted
Gulf-SaudiArabia: growth of India imports from SAUDI ARAB	2.22	Neutral / not counted
Gulf-UAE: growth of India exports to U ARAB EMTS	1.97	Neutral / not counted
Gulf-UAE: growth of India imports from U ARAB EMTS	0.77	Neutral / not counted

Figure 41.7. Each counted row (%)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

UAE: UAE share of India LPG imports40.5

UAE: UAE share of India LPG imports39

GCC: GCC (UAE, Saudi, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain) share of inward remittances38

Qatar: Qatar share of India LPG imports22

UAE: Share of India inward remittances (banks)19.2

Saudi Arabia: Saudi share of India LPG imports15

Kuwait: Kuwait share of India LPG imports14.7

Saudi Arabia: Share of India inward remittances (banks)6.7

Qatar: Share of India inward remittances (banks)4.1

Kuwait: Share of India inward remittances (banks)3.9

Oman: Share of India inward remittances (banks)2.5

Qatar: Qatar share of India LNG imports1.72

Bahrain: Share of India inward remittances (banks)1.5

0100%

Data table

	%	Side
UAE: UAE share of India LPG imports	40.5	Opposed
UAE: UAE share of India LPG imports	39	Opposed
GCC: GCC (UAE, Saudi, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain) share of inward remittances	38	Opposed
Qatar: Qatar share of India LPG imports	22	Opposed
UAE: Share of India inward remittances (banks)	19.2	Opposed
Saudi Arabia: Saudi share of India LPG imports	15	Opposed
Kuwait: Kuwait share of India LPG imports	14.7	Opposed
Saudi Arabia: Share of India inward remittances (banks)	6.7	Opposed
Qatar: Share of India inward remittances (banks)	4.1	Opposed
Kuwait: Share of India inward remittances (banks)	3.9	Opposed
Oman: Share of India inward remittances (banks)	2.5	Opposed
Qatar: Qatar share of India LNG imports	1.72	Opposed
Bahrain: Share of India inward remittances (banks)	1.5	Opposed

Figure 41.8. The 13 biggest of 13 (USD mn)

UAE: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 202625,586

Saudi Arabia: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20263,316

UAE: FDI equity inflow FY2023-24 / FY2024-25 / FY2025-262,924

UAE: FDI equity inflow calendar 20252,654

Qatar: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20261,777

Oman: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026618

Qatar: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025267

Bahrain: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026187

Kuwait: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 202698.9

Saudi Arabia: FDI equity inflow calendar 202554.2

Oman: FDI equity inflow calendar 202517.2

Kuwait: FDI equity inflow calendar 20252.37

Bahrain: FDI equity inflow calendar 20250.44

Data table

	USD mn	Side
UAE: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	25,586	Opposed
Saudi Arabia: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	3,316	Opposed
UAE: FDI equity inflow FY2023-24 / FY2024-25 / FY2025-26	2,924	Opposed
UAE: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	2,654	Opposed
Qatar: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	1,777	Opposed
Oman: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	618	Opposed
Qatar: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	267	Opposed
Bahrain: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	187	Opposed
Kuwait: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	98.9	Opposed
Saudi Arabia: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	54.2	Opposed
Oman: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	17.2	Opposed
Kuwait: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	2.37	Opposed
Bahrain: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	0.44	Opposed

Figure 41.9. The 6 biggest of 6 (persons)

UAE: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)34,25,144

Saudi Arabia: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)25,94,947

Kuwait: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)10,29,861

Oman: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)7,81,141

Qatar: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)7,46,550

Bahrain: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)3,26,658

Data table

	persons	Side
UAE: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)	34,25,144	Neutral / not counted
Saudi Arabia: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)	25,94,947	Neutral / not counted
Kuwait: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)	10,29,861	Neutral / not counted
Oman: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)	7,81,141	Neutral / not counted
Qatar: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)	7,46,550	Neutral / not counted
Bahrain: Overseas Indians (NRI + PIO)	3,26,658	Neutral / not counted

Figure 41.10. Each counted row (% of value)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Global Islam: GCC share of LPG imports (HS 271112 + 271113) FY2024-2595.1

Global Islam: GCC share of LPG imports (HS 271112 propane + 271113 butane) FY2025-2687.8

Global Islam: OIC share of LNG imports (HS 27111100) FY2025-2676.1

Global Islam: OIC share of LNG imports (HS 27111100) FY2024-2572.3

Global Islam: OIC share of India hydrocarbon import bill (crude + LNG + LPG) FY2025-2659.6

Global Islam: OIC share of crude oil imports (HS 2709) FY2025-2655.2

Global Islam: OIC share of crude oil imports (HS 2709) FY2024-2551.6

0100%

Data table

	% of value	Side
Global Islam: GCC share of LPG imports (HS 271112 + 271113) FY2024-25	95.1	Opposed
Global Islam: GCC share of LPG imports (HS 271112 propane + 271113 butane) FY2025-26	87.8	Opposed
Global Islam: OIC share of LNG imports (HS 27111100) FY2025-26	76.1	Opposed
Global Islam: OIC share of LNG imports (HS 27111100) FY2024-25	72.3	Opposed
Global Islam: OIC share of India hydrocarbon import bill (crude + LNG + LPG) FY2025-26	59.6	Opposed
Global Islam: OIC share of crude oil imports (HS 2709) FY2025-26	55.2	Opposed
Global Islam: OIC share of crude oil imports (HS 2709) FY2024-25	51.6	Opposed

Measure 5. Islamist networks & OIC: Formal religious money (FCRA)

Reading 94.5%

Hindu ₹328 cr vs Muslim ₹19 cr; informal Gulf money NO DATA, so weight 0

Figure 41.11. The 2 biggest of 2 (₹ crore)

Islamic Relief254

Helping Hand for Relief and Development0.7

Data table

	₹ crore	Side
Islamic Relief	254	Opposed
Helping Hand for Relief and Development	0.7	Opposed

Figure 41.12. The 3 biggest of 3 ($ billion)

Saudi investment pledge ($100 bn, Feb 2019)100

UAE investment target in India ($75 bn, Aug 2015 joint statement)75

Qatar investment commitment ($10 bn, Feb 2025)10

Data table

	$ billion	Side
Saudi investment pledge ($100 bn, Feb 2019)	100	Neutral / not counted
UAE investment target in India ($75 bn, Aug 2015 joint statement)	75	Neutral / not counted
Qatar investment commitment ($10 bn, Feb 2025)	10	Neutral / not counted

Figure 41.13. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where30 flows counted, ₹488 crore.

Opposed ₹487 cr · 99.8%Neutral / not counted ₹1 cr · 0.2%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 41.14. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)

Islamic Relief USA243

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation77.3

Laudes Foundation43.0

Kokni Muslim Association Birmingham35.8

AFMI15.1

The Ma'Arif Foundation Uk10.0

Human Concern International (Hci)9.16

Van Leer Foundation8.62

Islamic Relief - Ir Canada8.22

The Matliwala Family Charitable Trust4.55

International Islamic Link4.34

Molvi Ebrahim Mulla Foundation4.03

Hindutva-alignedOpposedTransactionalNeutral / not counted

Data table

	Opposed	Total
Islamic Relief USA	243	243
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	77.3	77.3
Laudes Foundation	43.0	43.0
Kokni Muslim Association Birmingham	35.8	35.8
AFMI	15.1	15.1
The Ma'Arif Foundation Uk	10.0	10.0
Human Concern International (Hci)	9.16	9.16
Van Leer Foundation	8.62	8.62
Islamic Relief - Ir Canada	8.22	8.22
The Matliwala Family Charitable Trust	4.55	4.55
International Islamic Link	4.34	4.34
Molvi Ebrahim Mulla Foundation	4.03	4.03

Figure 41.15. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)

Partner organisations in South Asia/India of Isl243

Aga Khan Foundation108

total expenditure of India-only charity (proxy; 58.6

Partner organisations in South Asia/India of AFM15.1

Islamic Relief Worldwide8.22

Aga Khan Foundation: India office6.71

Aga Khan University6.54

Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (India)5.9

'Transfer to India' (hospital and others)4.03

award to Matliwala School of Bharuch Gujarat (Da3.96

Darul Uloom Rahmania; Jamia Islamia Ishaatul Ulo3.59

Darul Uloom Rahmania; JAMIA ISLAMIA ISHAATUL ULO3.5

Hindutva-alignedOpposedTransactionalNeutral / not counted

Data table

	Opposed	Total
Partner organisations in South Asia/India of Isl	243	243
Aga Khan Foundation	108	108
total expenditure of India-only charity (proxy;	58.6	58.6
Partner organisations in South Asia/India of AFM	15.1	15.1
Islamic Relief Worldwide	8.22	8.22
Aga Khan Foundation: India office	6.71	6.71
Aga Khan University	6.54	6.54
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (India)	5.9	5.9
'Transfer to India' (hospital and others)	4.03	4.03
award to Matliwala School of Bharuch Gujarat (Da	3.96	3.96
Darul Uloom Rahmania; Jamia Islamia Ishaatul Ulo	3.59	3.59
Darul Uloom Rahmania; JAMIA ISLAMIA ISHAATUL ULO	3.5	3.5

Figure 41.16. By country of origin (₹ crore)

US336

GB80.5

CH43.0

CA19.8

NL8.62

Not stated0.08

Hindutva-alignedOpposedTransactionalNeutral / not counted

Data table

	Opposed	Neutral / not counted	Total
US	336	0	336
GB	79.3	1.17	80.5
CH	43.0	0	43.0
CA	19.8	0	19.8
NL	8.62	0	8.62
Not stated	0.08	0	0.08

Measure 6. Pakistan: Security: Lowy military and J&K exchange ratio

Reading 65.6%

g_pak_series.csv

Figure 41.17. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Lowy API 2025: India Diplomatic influence70.8

Lowy API 2025: India Resilience55.5

Lowy API 2025: India Future resources55.1

Lowy API 2025: India Military capability48

Lowy API 2025: India Cultural influence41.5

Lowy API 2025: India overall40

Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Diplomatic influence32.8

Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Resilience29.1

Lowy API 2025: India Economic capability27.1

Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Military capability23.6

Lowy API 2025: India Economic relationships19.7

Lowy API 2025: India Defence networks16.4

Lowy API 2025: Pakistan overall14.5

Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Defence networks13.8

Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Future resources12.2

0100

Hindutva-alignedOpposed

Data table

	score /100	Side
Lowy API 2025: India Diplomatic influence	70.8	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Resilience	55.5	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Future resources	55.1	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Military capability	48	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Cultural influence	41.5	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India overall	40	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Diplomatic influence	32.8	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Resilience	29.1	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: India Economic capability	27.1	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Military capability	23.6	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: India Economic relationships	19.7	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Defence networks	16.4	Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: Pakistan overall	14.5	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Defence networks	13.8	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Pakistan Future resources	12.2	Opposed

Figure 41.18. The 5 biggest of 5 (persons)

Pulwama attack 14 Feb 2019: CRPF personnel killed40

Pahalgam attack, 22 Apr 2025: civilians killed26

Pakistani shelling and strikes May 2025: Indian civilians killed21

Uri attack 18 Sep 2016: soldiers killed19

Pakistani shelling and strikes May 2025: Indian military/paramilitary killed8

Data table

	persons	Side
Pulwama attack 14 Feb 2019: CRPF personnel killed	40	Opposed
Pahalgam attack, 22 Apr 2025: civilians killed	26	Opposed
Pakistani shelling and strikes May 2025: Indian civilians killed	21	Opposed
Uri attack 18 Sep 2016: soldiers killed	19	Opposed
Pakistani shelling and strikes May 2025: Indian military/paramilitary killed	8	Opposed

Figure 41.19. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event)

Hindutva-aligned 0 event · 0.0%Opposed 1 event · 50.0%Transactional 0 event · 0.0%Neutral / not counted 1 event · 50.0%

Data table

	event	Share
Hindutva-aligned	0	0.0%
Opposed	1	50.0%
Transactional	0	0.0%
Neutral / not counted	1	50.0%

Figure 41.20. The 2 biggest of 2 (event)

Ceasefire 10 May 2025 17:00 IST1

Chinese J-10C fighters and PL-15 missiles used by Pakistan, May 20251

OpposedNeutral / not counted

Data table

	event	Side
Ceasefire 10 May 2025 17:00 IST	1	Neutral / not counted
Chinese J-10C fighters and PL-15 missiles used by Pakistan, May 2025	1	Opposed

Figure 41.21. Each counted row (% of the pair)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Pakistan: Pakistan nuclear warheads vs India, Pakistan share48.6

Pakistan: Mecca-pact trio (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) GDP vs India, trio share47.1

Pakistan: Pakistan military capability vs India (Lowy 2025), Pakistan share33

0100%

Data table

	% of the pair	Side
Pakistan: Pakistan nuclear warheads vs India, Pakistan share	48.6	Opposed
Pakistan: Mecca-pact trio (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) GDP vs India, trio share	47.1	Opposed
Pakistan: Pakistan military capability vs India (Lowy 2025), Pakistan share	33	Opposed

Figure 41.22. Over time: Pakistan (Ceasefire violations on the LoC and IB) · CFVs

Data table

	Pakistan: Ceasefire violations on the LoC and IB
2017	971
2018	2,140
2019	3,479
2020	5,133
2021	664
2022	1
2023	0
2024	2

Figure 41.23. Over time: Pakistan (J&K encounters) · encounters

Data table

	Pakistan: J&K encounters (MHA)
2018	189
2019	102
2020	118
2021	100
2022	117
2023	44
2024	24

Figure 41.24. Over time: Pakistan (Security forces killed in J&K, Civilians killed in J&K, All fatalities in J&K and 1 more) · persons

Pakistan: Security forces killed in J&K (MHA)Pakistan: Civilians killed in J&KPakistan: All fatalities in J&KPakistan: Security forces killed in J&KPakistan: Terrorists killed in J&K

Data table

	Pakistan: Security forces killed in J&K (MHA)	Pakistan: Civilians killed in J&K	Pakistan: All fatalities in J&K	Pakistan: Security forces killed in J&K	Pakistan: Terrorists killed in J&K
2014		28	189	47	114
2015		19	175	41	115
2016		14	267	88	165
2017		54	357	83	220
2018	91	86	452	95	271
2019	80	42	283	78	163
2020	63	33	321	56	232
2021	42	36	274	45	193
2022	32	30	253	30	193
2023	20	12	134	33	87
2024	14	31	127	26	69
2025		28	92	17	46
2026		2	28	2	23

Figure 41.25. Over time: Pakistan (Terrorist-initiated incidents in J&K, Major terror incidents in J&K) · incidents

Pakistan: Terrorist-initiated incidents in J&K (MHA)Pakistan: Major terror incidents in J&K

Data table

	Pakistan: Terrorist-initiated incidents in J&K (MHA)	Pakistan: Major terror incidents in J&K
2014		91
2015		86
2016		112
2017		163
2018	228	206
2019	153	135
2020	126	140
2021	129	153
2022	125	151
2023	41	72
2024	11	61
2025		35
2026		19

Measure 7. Pakistan: Economic (Lowy)

Reading 87.1%

Figure 41.26. Each counted row (0-10)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Pakistan: CHANNEL SCORE trade0.15

Data table

	0-10	Side
Pakistan: CHANNEL SCORE trade	0.15	Opposed

Figure 41.27. Over time: Pakistan (Pakistan’s share of India’s exports) · % of India total exports

Data table

	Pakistan: Pakistan’s share of India’s exports
2014	0.72
2015	0.6
2016	0.83
2017	0.66
2018	0.63
2019	0.63
2020	0.26
2021	0.11
2022	0.12
2023	0.14
2024	0.27
2025	0.13
2026	0.06

Figure 41.28. Over time: Pakistan (India’s exports to Pakistan, India’s imports from Pakistan, Trade balance with Pakistan) · $ billion

Pakistan: India’s exports to PakistanPakistan: India’s imports from PakistanPakistan: Trade balance with Pakistan

Data table

	Pakistan: India’s exports to Pakistan	Pakistan: India’s imports from Pakistan	Pakistan: Trade balance with Pakistan
2014	2.27	0.43	1.85
2015	1.86	0.5	1.36
2016	2.17	0.44	1.73
2017	1.82	0.45	1.37
2018	1.92	0.49	1.44
2019	2.07	0.5	1.57
2020	0.82	0.01	0.8
2021	0.33	0	0.32
2022	0.51	0	0.51
2023	0.63	0.02	0.61
2024	1.19	0	1.19
2025	0.56	0	0.56
2026	0.26	0	0.26

Figure 41.29. Over time: Pakistan (Pakistan’s share of India’s imports) · % of India total imports

Data table

	Pakistan: Pakistan’s share of India’s imports
2014	0.09
2015	0.11
2016	0.12
2017	0.12
2018	0.1
2019	0.1
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
2023	0
2024	0
2025	0
2026	0

Measure 8. Pakistan: Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)

Reading 78.8%

Figure 41.30. Each counted row (%)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

China share of Pakistan arms imports, 2021-25 (SIPRI)80

Pakistan share of Turkish arms exports, 2021-25 (SIPRI)16

0100%

Data table

	%	Side
China share of Pakistan arms imports, 2021-25 (SIPRI)	80	Opposed
Pakistan share of Turkish arms exports, 2021-25 (SIPRI)	16	Opposed

Figure 41.31. Each counted row (0-10)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Pakistan: CHANNEL SCORE diplomatic2.58

Data table

	0-10	Side
Pakistan: CHANNEL SCORE diplomatic	2.58	Opposed

Measure 9. Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)

Reading 14.0%

Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Indirect: Pakistan and Bangladesh use India's own opposing voices (opposition leaders, Left creators) to push their agenda. The analysis (Instagram reel) ↗

Figure 41.32. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)

Hindutva-aligned 777 million followers · 57.5%Opposed 545 million followers · 40.3%Transactional 0 million followers · 0.0%Neutral / not counted 30.6 million followers · 2.3%

Data table

	million followers	Share
Hindutva-aligned	777	57.5%
Opposed	545	40.3%
Transactional	0	0.0%
Neutral / not counted	30.6	2.3%

Figure 41.33. The 15 biggest of 413 (million followers)

Narendra Modi (@narendramodi)107

Narendra Modi (Instagram @narendramodi)107

Bhajan Marg (Premanand Maharaj) (Instagram @bhajanmarg_official)41.7

Amit Shah (@amitshah)36.7

Amit Shah (Instagram @amitshahofficial)34.3

Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath)32.7

Rahul Gandhi (@rahulgandhi)28.7

Arvind Kejriwal (@arvindkejriwal)26.5

Cockroach Janta Party (Instagram @cockroachjantaparty)24.8

Rajnath Singh (@rajnathsingh)24.1

BJP (@bjp4india)23.0

Akhilesh Yadav (@yadavakhilesh)20.4

Dhruv Rathee (Instagram @dhruvrathee)20.2

Vijay (Instagram @actorvijay)19.1

Yogi Adityanath (Instagram @myogi_adityanath)18.4

Hindutva-alignedOpposed

Data table

	million followers	Side
Narendra Modi (@narendramodi)	107	Hindutva-aligned
Narendra Modi (Instagram @narendramodi)	107	Hindutva-aligned
Bhajan Marg (Premanand Maharaj) (Instagram @bhajanmarg_official)	41.7	Hindutva-aligned
Amit Shah (@amitshah)	36.7	Hindutva-aligned
Amit Shah (Instagram @amitshahofficial)	34.3	Hindutva-aligned
Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath)	32.7	Hindutva-aligned
Rahul Gandhi (@rahulgandhi)	28.7	Opposed
Arvind Kejriwal (@arvindkejriwal)	26.5	Opposed
Cockroach Janta Party (Instagram @cockroachjantaparty)	24.8	Opposed
Rajnath Singh (@rajnathsingh)	24.1	Hindutva-aligned
BJP (@bjp4india)	23.0	Hindutva-aligned
Akhilesh Yadav (@yadavakhilesh)	20.4	Opposed
Dhruv Rathee (Instagram @dhruvrathee)	20.2	Opposed
Vijay (Instagram @actorvijay)	19.1	Opposed
Yogi Adityanath (Instagram @myogi_adityanath)	18.4	Hindutva-aligned

Measure 10. Bangladesh: Comprehensive power (Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs Bangladesh 9.0)

Reading 81.6%

Lowy Asia Power Index 2025

Figure 41.34. Each counted row (score /100)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Diplomatic influence26.5

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Resilience25.3

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh overall9

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Cultural influence7.1

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Future resources7

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Defence networks5.8

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Military capability5.2

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Economic capability3.2

Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Economic relationships2.2

0100

Data table

	score /100	Side
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Diplomatic influence	26.5	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Resilience	25.3	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh overall	9	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Cultural influence	7.1	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Future resources	7	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Defence networks	5.8	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Military capability	5.2	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Economic capability	3.2	Opposed
Lowy API 2025: Bangladesh Economic relationships	2.2	Opposed

Measure 11. Bangladesh: Contest of documented acts since Aug 2024

Reading 16.7%

By government: Yunus interim government (Aug 2024–Feb 2026) 2 Indian counter-moves (transshipment withdrawn, land-port curbs) vs 7 opposing acts (attacks on Hindus, 76 incidents in 26 Nov 2024–25 Jan 2025 per MEA; Chinmoy Das arrest; Hasina extradition note; Yunus “landlocked” remark; Hasina death sentence …); BNP government (PM Tarique Rahman, since 17 Feb 2026) 0 vs 3 (PM visit refused until Hasina is extradited, push-in clashes, Farakka renewal pressure). Total 2 vs 10 (g_others_units.csv; owner, round 2 D20)

Figure 41.35. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million)

Hindutva-aligned 18,287 US$ million · 41.4%Opposed 25,858 US$ million · 58.6%Transactional 0 US$ million · 0.0%Neutral / not counted 0 US$ million · 0.0%

Data table

	US$ million	Share
Hindutva-aligned	18,287	41.4%
Opposed	25,858	58.6%
Transactional	0	0.0%
Neutral / not counted	0	0.0%

Figure 41.36. The 6 biggest of 6 (US$ million)

Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise exports to BANGLADESH PR11,485

Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise exports to BANGLADESH PR10,587

Others-Bangladesh: India trade balance with BANGLADESH PR (exports minus imports)9,480

Others-Bangladesh: India trade balance with BANGLADESH PR (exports minus imports)8,807

Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise imports from BANGLADESH PR2,005

Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise imports from BANGLADESH PR1,780

Hindutva-alignedOpposed

Data table

	US$ million	Side
Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise exports to BANGLADESH PR	11,485	Opposed
Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise exports to BANGLADESH PR	10,587	Opposed
Others-Bangladesh: India trade balance with BANGLADESH PR (exports minus imports)	9,480	Hindutva-aligned
Others-Bangladesh: India trade balance with BANGLADESH PR (exports minus imports)	8,807	Hindutva-aligned
Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise imports from BANGLADESH PR	2,005	Opposed
Others-Bangladesh: India merchandise imports from BANGLADESH PR	1,780	Opposed

Figure 41.37. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event (1 = occurred; date in notes))

Hindutva-aligned 2 event (1 = occurred; date in notes) · 50.0%Opposed 2 event (1 = occurred; date in notes) · 50.0%Transactional 0 event (1 = occurred; date in notes) · 0.0%Neutral / not counted 0 event (1 = occurred; date in notes) · 0.0%

Data table

	event (1 = occurred; date in notes)	Share
Hindutva-aligned	2	50.0%
Opposed	2	50.0%
Transactional	0	0.0%
Neutral / not counted	0	0.0%

Figure 41.38. The 4 biggest of 4 (event (1 = occurred; date in notes))

Others-Bangladesh: India bars Bangladesh RMG and other goods via land ports (RMG only via Kolkata & Nhava Sheva)1

Others-Bangladesh: Bangladesh halted yarn imports via its land ports1

Others-Bangladesh: India bars jute products HS 531090, 560890, 560790, 630510 from Bangladesh via any land port; only1

Others-Bangladesh: Restrictions still in force; Bangladesh sought removal at 16th JWG on Trade1

Hindutva-alignedOpposed

Data table

	event (1 = occurred; date in notes)	Side
Others-Bangladesh: India bars Bangladesh RMG and other goods via land ports (RMG only via Kolkata & Nhava Sheva)	1	Hindutva-aligned
Others-Bangladesh: Bangladesh halted yarn imports via its land ports	1	Opposed
Others-Bangladesh: India bars jute products HS 531090, 560890, 560790, 630510 from Bangladesh via any land port; only	1	Hindutva-aligned
Others-Bangladesh: Restrictions still in force; Bangladesh sought removal at 16th JWG on Trade	1	Opposed

Figure 41.39. The 2 biggest of 2 (USD mn)

Bangladesh: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20260.1

Bangladesh: FDI equity inflow calendar 20250.02

Data table

	USD mn	Side
Bangladesh: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 2026	0.1	Opposed
Bangladesh: FDI equity inflow calendar 2025	0.02	Opposed

Figure 41.40. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event (count))

Hindutva-aligned 2 event (count) · 14.3%Opposed 10 event (count) · 71.4%Transactional 0 event (count) · 0.0%Neutral / not counted 2 event (count) · 14.3%

Data table

	event (count)	Share
Hindutva-aligned	2	14.3%
Opposed	10	71.4%
Transactional	0	0.0%
Neutral / not counted	2	14.3%

Figure 41.41. The 14 biggest of 14 (event (count))

Bangladesh 2024-08-05: PM Sheikh Hasina resigns and flees to India; remains in India as of Oct 20261

Bangladesh 2024-08-04/2024-08-20: Minority council (BHBCUC) reports 2,010 incidents of attacks on minorities in 16 days1

Bangladesh 2024-11-25: ISKCON-linked monk Chinmoy Krishna Das arrested (sedition); MEA expressed "deep concern" (26 Nov1

Bangladesh 2024-12-23: Bangladesh sends note verbale to India seeking Hasina's extradition1

Bangladesh 2024-11-26/2025-01-25: MoS External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh tells Lok Sabha: 76 incidents of anti-Hindu1

Bangladesh 2025-03-26/2025-03-29: CA Muhammad Yunus in China calls India's NE "landlocked" and Bangladesh "guardian of1

Bangladesh 2025-04-04: Modi-Yunus meeting on BIMSTEC sidelines, Bangkok (Hasina extradition, minorities, border1

Bangladesh 2025-04-08: India withdraws transshipment facility for Bangladesh export cargo via Indian land customs1

Bangladesh 2025-05-17: India restricts imports of Bangladeshi RMG, processed food etc. via NE land ports (RMG only via1

Bangladesh 2025-11-17: ICT-1 sentences Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity (July 20241

Bangladesh 2026-02-12: Bangladesh general election: BNP & allies 212 seats (two-thirds); Jamaat-led bloc 77; Tarique1

Bangladesh 2026-08-16: Dhaka says PM Tarique Rahman will not visit India until Hasina is extradited; proposed 20-25 Aug1

Bangladesh 2026-10: BSF "push-in" attempts blocked by BGB (Panchagarh 7 Oct; Lalmonirhat 12 people, 18 Oct)1

Bangladesh 2026-12-12 (expiry): Ganges (Farakka) Water Sharing Treaty 1996 expires 12 Dec 2026; Dhaka pressing for1

Hindutva-alignedOpposedNeutral / not counted

Data table

	event (count)	Side
Bangladesh 2024-08-05: PM Sheikh Hasina resigns and flees to India; remains in India as of Oct 2026	1	Neutral / not counted
Bangladesh 2024-08-04/2024-08-20: Minority council (BHBCUC) reports 2,010 incidents of attacks on minorities in 16 days	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2024-11-25: ISKCON-linked monk Chinmoy Krishna Das arrested (sedition); MEA expressed "deep concern" (26 Nov	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2024-12-23: Bangladesh sends note verbale to India seeking Hasina's extradition	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2024-11-26/2025-01-25: MoS External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh tells Lok Sabha: 76 incidents of anti-Hindu	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2025-03-26/2025-03-29: CA Muhammad Yunus in China calls India's NE "landlocked" and Bangladesh "guardian of	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2025-04-04: Modi-Yunus meeting on BIMSTEC sidelines, Bangkok (Hasina extradition, minorities, border	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2025-04-08: India withdraws transshipment facility for Bangladesh export cargo via Indian land customs	1	Hindutva-aligned
Bangladesh 2025-05-17: India restricts imports of Bangladeshi RMG, processed food etc. via NE land ports (RMG only via	1	Hindutva-aligned
Bangladesh 2025-11-17: ICT-1 sentences Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity (July 2024	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2026-02-12: Bangladesh general election: BNP & allies 212 seats (two-thirds); Jamaat-led bloc 77; Tarique	1	Neutral / not counted
Bangladesh 2026-08-16: Dhaka says PM Tarique Rahman will not visit India until Hasina is extradited; proposed 20-25 Aug	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2026-10: BSF "push-in" attempts blocked by BGB (Panchagarh 7 Oct; Lalmonirhat 12 people, 18 Oct)	1	Opposed
Bangladesh 2026-12-12 (expiry): Ganges (Farakka) Water Sharing Treaty 1996 expires 12 Dec 2026; Dhaka pressing for	1	Opposed

Measure 12. Bangladesh: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)

Reading 14.0%

Measure 13. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 41.42. Over time: Hostile acts recorded, Pakistan: Hostile acts recorded · events

Hostile acts recordedPakistan: Hostile acts recorded

Data table

	Hostile acts recorded	Pakistan: Hostile acts recorded
2016		1
2019	2	2
2022	1
2025	2	5
2026	2	1

Figure 41.43. Over time: OIC statements on India · OIC statements/resolutions on India recorded

Data table

	OIC statements on India
2017	1
2019	2
2022	1
2025	1
2026	2

Figure 41.44. Over time: Saudi Arabia’s share of India’s exports, UAE’s share of India’s exports · % of India total exports

Saudi Arabia’s share of India’s exportsUAE’s share of India’s exports

Data table

	Saudi Arabia’s share of India’s exports	UAE’s share of India’s exports
2014	3.89	9.71
2015	3.6	10.6
2016	2.43	11.6
2017	1.85	11.3
2018	1.78	9.27
2019	1.68	9.13
2020	1.99	9.21
2021	2.01	5.72
2022	2.08	6.65
2023	2.38	7.01
2024	2.64	8.15
2025	2.69	8.37
2026	2.33	8.46

Figure 41.45. Over time: India’s exports to Saudi Arabia, India’s imports from Saudi Arabia, Trade balance with Saudi Arabia and 3 more · $ billion

India’s exports to Saudi ArabiaIndia’s imports from Saudi ArabiaTrade balance with Saudi ArabiaIndia’s exports to UAEIndia’s imports from UAETrade balance with UAE

Data table

	India’s exports to Saudi Arabia	India’s imports from Saudi Arabia	Trade balance with Saudi Arabia	India’s exports to UAE	India’s imports from UAE	Trade balance with UAE
2014	12.2	36.4	-24.2	30.5	29.0	1.5
2015	11.2	28.1	-16.9	33.0	26.1	6.89
2016	6.38	20.3	-13.9	30.3	19.4	10.9
2017	5.11	20.0	-14.9	31.2	21.5	9.67
2018	5.41	22.1	-16.7	28.1	21.7	6.41
2019	5.56	28.5	-22.9	30.1	29.8	0.34
2020	6.24	26.9	-20.6	28.9	30.3	-1.4
2021	5.86	16.2	-10.3	16.7	26.6	-9.94
2022	8.76	34.1	-25.3	28.0	44.8	-16.8
2023	10.7	42.0	-31.3	31.6	53.2	-21.6
2024	11.6	31.4	-19.9	35.6	46.8	-11.2
2025	11.8	30.1	-18.4	36.6	63.4	-26.8
2026	10.3	30.8	-20.5	37.4	63.9	-26.5

Figure 41.46. Over time: Saudi Arabia’s share of India’s imports, UAE’s share of India’s imports · % of India total imports

Saudi Arabia’s share of India’s importsUAE’s share of India’s imports

Data table

	Saudi Arabia’s share of India’s imports	UAE’s share of India’s imports
2014	8.09	6.45
2015	6.27	5.83
2016	5.33	5.1
2017	5.2	5.6
2018	4.74	4.67
2019	5.54	5.79
2020	5.66	6.37
2021	4.1	6.75
2022	5.56	7.31
2023	5.87	7.43
2024	4.66	6.94
2025	4.18	8.79
2026	3.97	8.24

Figure 41.47. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)Each player’s weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.

Western media, academia, philanthropy and rights bodies84.6

USA72

China72

Big Tech53.1

Global Islam47.1

India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power40

Others16.5

Global Christianity9

Data table

	Value	Side
Western media, academia, philanthropy and rights bodies	84.6	Other
USA	72	Other
China	72	Other
Big Tech	53.1	Other
Global Islam	47.1	Opposed
India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power	40	Other
Others	16.5	Other
Global Christianity	9	Other

Figure 41.48. Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)

Reading52.2%132 : 121

Terrorists killedSecurity forces and civilians killed

Data table

	Terrorists killed	Security forces and civilians killed	Terrorists killed share
Reading	132	121	52.2%

41.6Evidence base

The arena rests on 308 coded units, 30 money flows and 302 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 39 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 264 opposed and 35 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 199 grade A, 37 grade B, 73 grade C, 11 grade D, 2 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

Terrorists killed 1753 vs security forces and civilians 950 (SATP). ↩
J&K 132 vs 106 (SATP, Pahalgam included) plus the Red Fort car bomb, 10 Nov 2025 (15 killed). ↩
g_pak_series.csv. ↩
Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Indirect: Pakistan and Bangladesh use India's own opposing voices (opposition leaders, Left creators) to push their agenda.. ↩
Lowy Asia Power Index 2025. ↩
By government: Yunus interim government (Aug 2024–Feb 2026) 2 Indian counter-moves (transshipment withdrawn, land-port curbs) vs 7 opposing acts (attacks on Hindus, 76 incidents in 26 Nov 2024–25 Jan 2025 per MEA; Chinmoy Das arrest; Hasina extradition note; Yunus “landlocked” remark; Hasina death sentence …); BNP government (PM Tarique Rahman, since 17 Feb 2026) 0 vs 3 (PM visit refused until Hasina is extradited, push-in clashes, Farakka renewal pressure). Total 2 vs 10 (g_others_units.csv; owner, round 2 D20). ↩